Wednesday, 26 December 2012

An Inaugural Lecture



Siyan Oyeweso, (2006), The Undertakers, The Python’s Eye and Footsteps of the Ant: The Historian’s Burden, (22nd Inaugural Lecture, Lagos State University, Lagos State University Press).

An Idea of History
For once, let us all assume that we desire to know who we are as an ethnic group, clan, nation or nation-state. We are all bound to make recourse to history. History is a biography of an issue, subject, peoples and events. There is the history of science, the history of money, the history of philosophy, the history of epistemology. There is even the history of religion. Indeed, a famous author wrote a book titled The Bible as a Story Book. All of us, whether Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulani, Bini or members of other ethnic groups, we all trace our histories laced with myth. Yet we believe in the myth. A myth is not necessarily a lie. We, however, hold unto to the myth because it serves the purpose of giving meaning to our existence by conferring identity on us. In Swedish history, for instance, there is reference to the Vikings, and all the myths built around them. To refer to history as biography is merely to speak to one aspect of history.
My idea of History is premised on the conviction that to understand a people, the historian must have a recourse to what happened in the past, why it happened and how it happened, not just through a systematic collation of beliefs and practices, but also through critical analysis of all other sources and branches of knowledge that are capable of serving historical ends and in this way, adopt a multidisciplinary approach and root explanation on the principle of causation. The past may be dead to some people; but I am happy to say that I am not an undertaker and that I fellowship only with the genre of people who would not want the past to disappear from our consciousness merely because it is past.  
The tragedy of Nigeria is three-fold: a lack of knowledge of its history; a lack of understanding of that history and a lack of application of the examples and lessons of history. This is what I call the Unholy Trinity.  It is a Trinity of ignorance packaged as knowledge; it is falsehood, rumour mongering that should attract intellectual contempt from the public. The Nigerian elite are the guiltiest of this charge. They are educated, yet they have very little knowledge or understanding of Nigerian history and the lessons it handed down. Hence, rather than for history to serve an emancipative role for Nigerians it has become the original sin that is held liable for all of Nigeria’s woes. Upon this sin lies the claim of “amalgamation of misfits”, the “mistake of 1914” and so on. History is been blamed for a failed project and buffeted from all angles. (OLaniyan, 2004).
The Nigerian past is seen as a burden to all historians and students of society. A proper knowledge and understanding of that past is the only avenue of emancipating ourselves from it.  Indeed, I share the view that the past and the present do not exist in any dichotomous relationship; for the past is the father of the present. They are forged organically and in an engaging and interlocking manner. (Carr, 1961:p.21). Indeed, this point was underscored by Albert Einstein, the father of theory of relativity when, in 1955, he contends that the distinction between the past, the present and the future is only an illusion. He avers, “the law of physics as we know are ‘time symmetric’, they just run as well backwards as forward in time”. Isaac Newton,  the great physicist, also said the future already exists and that it can be known in advance . The renowned poet, T.S. Elliot similarly expressed this notion of time when he notes, “Time present and time past are both perhaps present in time future is contained  in time past”. Human experience is, no doubt, a historical continuum as this inaugural lecture started some minutes ago in the time past. I deliver this lecture now in the time present and by the time I conclude it will be in the time future. Thus, the historian should not just bury himself in the very distant past, he should also be actively engaged in the study of contemporary issues or events. The Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce submits that: “The practical requirements which underlie every historical judgment give to all history the character of ‘Contemporary History’”. (Croce, 1941:p.19). 
History is the study of the past, only to the extent that the past exists up to the last micro-second. The goal of historical scholarship is to make the present more comprehensible and the past not an unfathomable mirage. Thus, history is a wedlock of the past, the present and the future. In the unending dialogue among the trinity, the initiative lies with the present; how we introspect, construct and shape it to make the future more meaningful and the past better appreciated. (Uzoigwe, 1983:p.2-6).
THE HISTORIAN
The hallmark of a great historian is his ability, as Lord Acton puts it, “to do the best he can for the other side, and to avoid pertinacity or emphasis on his”. (Acton, 1983).           A historian is a very responsible individual, a scholar of controlled imagination, sound judgment and native commonsense. When others prefer to take on the role of an undertaker to the detriment of our collective experience or group memory, the historian prefers to be the custodian of that group memory. He is a very critical scholar who is interested in asking the question, why? And until he can have satisfying and satisfactory answers to his questions, he would not relent.  He usually based all his conclusions and research on solid and verifiable evidence. By the methodology, training and comportment, he is the most objective scholar in matters appertaining to human affairs, whether remote or contemporary. Objectivity, in this sense does not mean a negation of the subjective, rather it allows for the recognition of and a conscious attempt to utilize facts and concepts in a scientific way. (Walsh, 1967).
Mr. Vice – Chancellor, Sir, there is need or me to now clarify three concepts employed in this lecture: The Undertakers; The Python’s Eye; and The Footsteps of the Ants.
The undertakers, the python’s Eye and the Footsteps of the Ants
Who Are The Undertakers?
In ordinary usage, undertakers are funeral directors, otherwise known as morticians. In this category are also found funeral service workers, embalmers and funeral attendants. The morticians handle the logistics of the funeral. Embalmers prepare the dead for burial by washing it with germicidal soap, while funeral attendants assist the undertaker or funeral director in ensuring that funeral service is well conducted, organised and hitch-free. The undertaker’s business is generally viewed as a macabre business, a morbid business. In short, undertakers are professionals who bury the dead in a befitting way. But once the dead is buried, their mission is accomplished as, according to them, the dead is gone and gone forever.


Undertakers and the Discipline of History
In an increasingly materialistic and technological age, many undertakers have emerged for the discipline of history. To them, history is a useless or at best a not – so – useful discipline. Some have even observed that the society cannot afford to waste money on useless or unnecessary knowledge such as history. The argument is that there is no rational basis to offer university chairs, finance archaeological reserves and conferences in history since, to them, the knowledge of the past is useless and cannot help decide the urgent problems of contemporary society. In fact, the critical questions often raised are, “why do we need knowledge of the past”? Can history be of use to the modern humanity whose primary and immediate concerns centre on energy and communication, hunger and poverty, peace, protection of the environment, mass unemployment and underemployment, management of Bird flu and HIV/AIDS pandemic, among others? I shall attempt to demonstrate in this lecture that this perception of history by the undertakers is grossly incorrect and highly self-serving.
The Python
The python belongs to the reptile family of animal kingdom. It is a collective name for non-poisonous snakes of the Boidae family. It is also belongs to a specie of some of the biggest snakes in the world. One feature of pythons is that they do not chase after their prey; instead they are ambush-hunters. They use both sight and smell to locate prey. A specie of pythons, particularly Bismarck Ringed Pythons, have sharp snout and wedge – shaped head, perfect for burrowing or digging through the soil. They are empowered to dig or burrow like the archaeologist. According to experts, about 20-25 species of pythons exist and are commonly found in the tropical and sub-tropical regions of Africa, Asia, Australia and the Pacific Islands. The African rock python is about 6.5 metres (23 feet) long.
Python is large and muscular, and kills its prey by squeezing or constricting its victim, until it is suffocated. One other feature of the python is the keenness, sharpness, alertness of its eyes. According to naturalists, pythons are imbued with very penetrating sight and vision.
The Ant    
Experts say that “Communication among ants is highly efficient and is conducted mainly through tactile and chemical means.” Entomologists informed us that an ant, when observed under the microscope, is a ravishing beauty. “The jaws are sharp as a saw. The feet are light and are designed for rapid movement.” An ant has a good smelling sense. No matter how  tightly sealed a packet of sugar, the ant would certainly be able to penetrate it through a tiny hole. The ants, in their colony and in other places, have very soft footsteps that are never recognizable by ordinary humans. In scientific texts and other literatures, ants are described as very orderly, cooperative, organized, hardworking, and disciplined insects. 
The Undertakers and History
The major objection to history as a branch of knowledge was articulated by the seventeenth century scientist and the father of modern French  philosophy, Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650), thus:
To live with men of an earlier age is like traveling in foreign lands. It is useful to know something of the manners of other peoples in order to judge more impartially of our own, and not despise and ridicule whatever differs from them, like men who have never been outside their native country. But those who travel too long end by being strangers in their own homes, and those who study too curiously the actions of antiquity are ignorant of what is done among ourselves today. Moreover, these narratives tell us of things which cannot have happened as if they had really taken place, and thus invite us to attempt what is beyond our powers or to hope for what is beyond our fate. And even histories, true though they be, and neither exaggerating nor altering the value of things, omit circumstances of a meaner and less dignified kind in order to become more worthy of a reader's attention – hence the things which they describe never happened exactly as they describe them, and men who try to model their own acts upon them are prone to the madness of romantic paladins and meditate hyperbolical deed. (Collingwood, 1963:p.59).
The foregoing quotation can be reduced to four main issues. The first is what R. G. Collingwood called “historical escapism”, i.e. the belief that a historian is a traveler who by living far away from home becomes a stranger to his own age. The second issue is “historical pyrrhonism”, i.e. historical narratives are not reliable and accurate accounts of the past. The third issue relates to the rejection of history as a tool for understanding societies. Fourthly, history is seen as fantasy building; that historians always attempt to depict events more than they really are/were.
With regards to the first postulation, it is not true that the practice of history makes the historian ignorant of his own age or generation. The historian can only have a thorough grasp of the past if he is firmly rooted to the present. The traditional practice of the historian is not to live entirely out of his own age but to be a respectable person of his age and to interprete the past from the stand point of that age. Immanuel Kant proved that historical knowledge is possible not only without the historians abandoning the stand point of his own age, but precisely because he does not abandon that stand point. Secondly, Rene Descartes’ claim that historical narrative relates event that could not have happened is also contestable. However, the substantive issue seems to be that Descartes was advocating a critical approach to historical past and adoption of such a measure would be the answer to his own objection. Thirdly, Descartes’ believes that history has no value. Hegel was to reformulate this thus, “The practical lesson of history is that no one ever learns anything from History”. This, to me, is a gross misunderstanding of the historical process. Although, the mistakes of the past are somehow committed in the present, the intensity and gravity of such mistakes are lessened by an awareness of the problems engendered in the past.
Finally, Descartes’ contention that the historical narrative romanticises the splendour of the past when interpreted in its contextual setting was a call to practitioners of the profession to improve their research. Indeed, he was setting the criteria by which concealed or mystified truths could be rediscovered.  To be sure, his primary intellectual pursuit was not in history as such but in mathematics and physics. Hence, his thesis remained undeveloped and was to be taken up later by Gambastita Vico in the 18th century. (Haddock, 1980:pp.60-71). The attitude of Descartes to history was one of skepticism and his writings were geared towards driving away people from history in order to encourage them to embrace the pure sciences.   
Apart from Rene Descartes, some undertakers are of the opinion that history-as-record is a dangerous delusion totally irrelevant to the predicament of modern humanity, and at worse, a serious menace to human freedom and  to humanity. Paul Valery, belongs to this group. He contends that:
History is the most dangerous product which the chemistry of the mind has concocted. Its properties are well known. It produces dreams and drunkenness. It fills people with false memories, exaggerates their reactions, exacerbates old grievances, torments them in their repose, and encourages either a delirium of grandeur or a delusion of persecution. It makes whole nations bitter, arrogant, insufferable, and vainglorious.(Fitscher, 1970:pp.307-308).
In Aldous Huxley's After Many a Summer Dies the Swan, Mr. Propter is reported to have said: “After all, history isn't the real thing. Past time is only evil at a distance; and of course, the study of past time is itself a process in time. Cataloguing bits of fossil evil can never be more than an ersatz for eternity." In the same author's The Genius and the Goddess, John Rivers compares history to a "dangerous drug" and dismisses it as a productive discipline of knowledge: (Huxley, 1956:p.81).
God isn't the son of memory: He's the son of Immediate Experience. You can't worship a spirit in spirit, unless you do it now. Wallowing in the past may be good literature. As wisdom, it's hopeless. Time Regained is Paradise Lost, and Time Lost is Paradise Regained. Let the dead bury their dead. If you want to live at every moment as it presents itself, you've got to die at every other moment. That's the most important thing I learned (Huxley, 1956:p.4).
 Valery’s and Huxley’s views are somehow identical to that of a Russian Czar who banned the teaching of history because it was considered dangerous. Truly, history can be a dangerous pill to the ruling class, particularly when the class is challenged by rebellion, revolution and change. This may partly explain why successive military dictatorships and civilian administrations in Nigeria have implemented policies designed to relegate history to the backwaters of national development. To the Amins, Bandas,  Pinochets,  Nguemas,  and Mobutus of the world, history will always be a deadly pill. (Nwankwo, 1997).
Reuben Abati of The Guardian newspaper, quoted President Olusegun Obasanjo as reported stating in Nigeria’s The Sun thus:
We must reorganize our curriculum so as to evolve the right kind of education. Our universities must as of necessity re-focus by moving away from arts-based courses to science based ones to reposition the country ahead. It is mis-education for anyone to offer mass communication as a course of study in the university… some people came to me and they said they have two Masters degrees and yet cannot get a job.
Then I asked what did you read and they replied Mass Communication, the other one is sociology, then I told them you are uneducated. You have to go and be re-educated to create value for your skill.(The Guardian on Sunday, 14 August, 2005).
Vice-Chancellor, Sir, the attitude of President Olusegun Obasanjo to history is not entirely new. For it was during the military regime presided over by him from February 1976  to October 1979 that a new National Policy on Education was designed, and it choked history education out of our schools’ curriculum. Proponents of the new policy replaced history with Social Studies at Junior Secondary School (JSS) while history survives only as an option at the Senior Secondary School (SSS) level. This is a dangerous and endangering national policy because, “by denying us the benefit of a systematic study of the past, we limit our capacity to understand ourselves and the world.” (Ade-Ajayi, 2005). We cannot as a result answer the following questions: who are we as a people and as a nation? And where are we heading? Collective self-identity is a shared and reciprocal feeling that underlines the national project. To share that feeling there is need for a collective self-appreciation and introspection, to know the tribulations and triumphs of the nation, from hence grows the avowals and committed to a shared future. The African-Americans call it linked-fate. I will return to this issue presently, when I discuss the citizenship question in Nigeria.
The Lessons of History
It is often said that history has taught us nothing, “people and governments have never learned anything from history or acted on principles deduced from it”.(Hegel, 1975).  G. F.W. Hegel, in particular, doubted its utility but many historians have categorically disputed that view. The Russian historian, Klyuchevsky, for instance, writes:
History, say those who do not study it but only philosophise about it and therefore scorn it-Hegel-has never taught anyone anything. Even if that were true, it does not in the least apply to history as a science; flowers are not to blame that the blind do not see them. But it is not true; history teaches even those who do not study it, it teaches them a lesson for ignoring and disdaining it. Those who act without it, or in spite of it, always ultimately regret their attitude to it. As yet it teaches not how to live by it, but how to learn from it....
History is power; when it is good to people, they forget about it and ascribe their prosperity to themselves; when it becomes bad for them, they begin to feel its necessity and value it boons. (Rakitov, 1982:  ).
Should any one persist in saying that “the only lesson of history is that nobody learns from history”? The appropriate answer will be the one given by Emeritus  Professor  Isaac Adeagbo Akinjogbin: such a person is not just an ego (a stupid person) but an Omugo  (a thoroughly stupid  person who makes foolishness his constant delight). (Akinjogbin, 1977).  Among the Yoruba, for instance, the lessons of history have somehow been preserved in writings, proverbs and aphorisms. Let me  offer two examples here. In Oyo history, Bashorun Gaha was a powerful, tyrannical and blood-sucking prime – minister who had the unenviable record of raising five Alafins to the throne, murdered four and was himself killed by the fifth. His corpse was later dismembered. In the aftermath of his death, the following saying became popular: Ronu iku Gaha ko se rere “Reflect upon Gaha’s death and mend your ways”. This is a specific and clear warning to all aspiring tyrants, usurpers, malevolent characters and dictators. History is indeed the graveyard of dictators. Another aphorism of relevance to our lecture is: L’aye Abiodun L’afi Igba won wo, Laiye Aole L’adi adikale (In Abiodun’s reign, money was weighed in bushels. In Aole’s reign, we packed up to flee). The thrust of this saying is to emphasize the importance of good governance by rulers.
The use of imagery and the practice of history
I have chosen the imagery of undertakers, the python’s eye and footsteps of the Ant to demonstrate the extent to which the discipline of history can be used to proffer solutions to contemporary problems in Nigeria nay Africa. Yet, I am very conscious of the fact that rather than castigate history as the undertakers do, the discipline can be more fruitfully used to illuminate certain critical issues that have and will continue to have dire consequences in our national life.
The image of the python is that of a person imbued with vision and insight and who is specially gifted to offer solutions to the problems of society. In virtually all traditional societies of the world the standard practice for the ruling elite was to engage the services of Historical Advisers. In the Old Oyo, the Historical Advisers were known as the Arokin.  Among the Mande of Senegal, Guinea and Mali, Historical Advisers were called Belen-Tigui and were generally respected as wise men because they are repositories of historical knowledge and wisdom. Among the Ikwere people of the Niger Delta, the historian is described as the man or woman with the python’s eye in recognition of his deep knowledge of history and for having the intellectual resources of providing a deeper insight into current affairs. Indeed, no object/subject can be hidden from the sight of the python because of its penetrating sight and vision. Thus, no deeds or records of the past can be completely shielded away from the eyes of the trained historian. (Alagoa, 1980).
Vice-Chancellor, Sir, the image of the Ant employed in this lecture is that of an insect imbued with great wisdom. The implication is that the historian has taken great pains to study the Ant, to recognize its footsteps where others cannot even notice them. The historian is, thus, a very disciplined and meticulous investigator. He is trained to see what others cannot see and unearth what others would want to bury and bury forever. The historian is also capable of listening attentively so as to hear even the soft footsteps of the ant. His duty, at times, may be akin to that of a detective deeply immersed in the process of unraveling what David McCullough call “the mysteries of chance and genius.” The Bible indeed supports this view of the Ant and admonishes humans to learn from the ant. The Book of Proverbs, at Chapter 6, Verse 6, is quite explicit on this: “Go to the ants, thou sluggard, consider her ways and be wise.”
The Holy Qur’an dedicates the whole of Chapter 27 to the ant in Suratu’maml. The relevant passage is Verse 15. However, in this chapter the ant occupies the position of King Solomon who was a great personage, reputed for his wisdom. The historian is thus seen as a man or woman of great wisdom and knowledge who is able to reconstruct the past on the basis of fragmented evidence which exists in the present. Since the central focus of the historians study is the past, his primary responsibility to contemporary society, is to provide insight and reflection on a previous epoch that is germane to our understanding of the present one.
It is in this context that, I now wish to move to address the indigene/settler question in Nigeria, partly as a response to Professor Obaro Ikime’s challenge that Nigerian historians should select for study subjects which relate to our national needs and problems. Ikime asserts:
History must have a purpose, our country is seeking to forge a true nation that demands the instinctive loyalty of its citizenry…. Increasingly, our researchers must take into consideration national problems of political and social relations, of government and government systems and the ends which society seeks to attain… history (must) make some definite contribution to the national effort in its varying ramifications (Ikime, 1979)..
Mr. Vice – Chancellor, Sir, Nigeria is currently facing a citizenship crisis which falls within the rubric of what is euphemistically called the National Question. It has, become a recurring decimal in several African states with varying impact on peace, stability and security of these states. In particular, Rwanda, Burundi and Cote D’Ivoire have witnessed civil wars on issues connected with interest groups  contestations over citizenship. In the Nigerian case, the indigene/settler divide has also, among other considerations, been responsible for the worsening ethnic and religious conflicts which the country had witnessed since the 1980s. What is the historical and structural context of the citizenship question in Africa and Nigeria? What is the linkage, if any, with the colonial state? Is the citizenship crisis structurally rooted in the Nigerian past? What are the constitutional and juridical implications of the indigeneity/citizenship question vis-à-vis the 1999 constitution? And what impact does all of these have on federalism and the future of the Nigerian polity? I will address these questions in the course of the lecture.
In 1980, the Second Republic administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari set for Africa the dangerous precedent of challenging the nationality of its leading citizens, particularly those it considered political opponents or those with critical or opposing viewpoints about how the affairs of the state should be run. In that year, the administration deported Alhaji Abdurrahman Shugaba, the majority leader of the Borno State House of Assembly, to Chad on the allegation that he was not a Nigerian. Shugaba’s father was, in fact, a member of the Bargami group, born in a country now known as Chad, but neither Chad nor Nigeria existed then. Shugaba was conscripted into the Sultan’s Army and eventually settled in Maiduguri in 1911. He subsequently got married to a Maiduguri woman and this was how Abdul Rahaman Shugaba was conceived and born. The amalgamation of 1914 was yet to be contemplated at the time in question. Although the court later restored Shugaba’s right, Africa has since witnessed worse cases. The crises in Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo and many other parts of the continent are rooted in the citizenship question. Citizenship, as the basis of identity crisis in post colonial Africa, took its roots with colonial boundaries. And at the heart of most post-colonial citizenship crisis in Africa is the colonially-constructed artificial boundaries which tore brethrens and ethnically-homogenous groups into several states, the balkanization of ethnicities or nations into several states or countries now turned these brethrens on both divides into enemies and allies, depending on the way the political pendulum tilted or swung, and what is at stake.
 In 1996, Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia (1964 to 1991) and Allassane Quattara of Cote D’Ivoire suddenly became “foreigners” in their respective countries. There have also been loud claims that the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was a Murundi! That Mobutu Seseseko of Zaire was from Central African Republic, that Idi Amin Dada was a Sudanese; that Daniel Arap–Moi is a Sudanese; that Omar Bongo is a Congolese; that President Yoweri Museveni is a Tutsi; and that Nelson “Madiba” Mandela is also a Tutsi.
Recently, too, in Nigeria, Governor Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State stirred the hornet’s nest when he declared that some former presidents of Nigeria, including Shehu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Sanni Abacha and Abdulsalam Abubakar; are also “foreigners” whose historical roots lie beyond Nigeria’s geographical border.
One preliminary remark that can be safely made is that some of these claims arose partly out of the artificial nature of Africa’s boundaries and the changing definitions of citizenship imposed on the peoples of Africa by the colonial state and the post-colonial state. Indeed, it is important to note that the borders of Cote D’Ivoire, for instance, were altered four times between 1900 and 1960. In the post – colonial states, citizenship continues to derive, in most cases, from ancestry but with the people of the same ancestry balkanized into different countries. For instance, the Yoruba ethnic group is partitioned into Nigeria, Benin Republic and Cote D’Ivoire, while the Fulani are found across Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina  Faso, Sierra Leone, Senegal and indeed the whole of the West African sub-region. The same point can be made about the Hausa people. It is within this context of the artificial nature of African borders that we can raise the question: why should the Yoruba in Pobe, Sakete, Ketu and Ajase (Porto-Novo) be citizens of Benin Republic while those in Badagry, Imeko, Abeokuta, Lagos, Ile-Ife, Ibadan and Ede are regarded as Nigerian citizens? It is also a paradox, that such communities as Chabe, Idaacha, Ife, Manigiri which are historically Yoruba sub-groups, within the Yoruba nation, are now bona-fide citizens of Benin Republic.  
Taken altogether, I propose a sociological trichotomy - citizenship in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa. I suggest that each of these historical conjunctures threw up different forms of social relations, contradictions, and responses to the citizenship question. We must not therefore treat them as though they are the same or similar. However, in current discourses of citizenship in Africa, many scholars and commentators take an ahistorical approach to the subject-matter by trying to treat each era or conjuncture as though they were the same. This is at the heart of the confusion about whether Nigerians are better off remaining as autonomous nations, a federating nation-state or a dismembered state-nation. At the heart of this discourse is a culturalist and not a political interpretation of the role of nation-states. Also at the heart of this culturalist perspective is a purist, homogenous and unchanging character of the nation. To be sure, cultural and ethnic homogeneity are confused with cultural unity, consensus and harmony. And cultural heterogeneity is confused with disharmony, conflict and instability. Such analysts refused to realise that every society whether homogeneous or heterogeneous have inherently conflictual factors. Hence, although a nation may be culturally homogenous, non-cultural issues such as access to and competition over scarce economic resources and political power could be come sources of conflict. How these factors are managed within the context of statecraft is the fundamental problem of nation states.
I propose that it is not the character of ethnic or cultural entities that matters or poses a problem to nation-states, rather it is statecraft and the management of the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the society that matters. In making this submission, I am urging that we turn culturalist discourse into political discourse and to turn our attention to the nature of statecraft in society. It is only in this context that the clamour for restructuring of the federation becomes meaningful. Although there is no such thing as “true” or “false” federalism, however it is possible to practice a federal structure that ensures that federating units have access to and control over their resources and yet fulfill their social obligation to other federating units within the country, in the spirit of K.C.  Wheare’s classical definition of federalism. In spite of various criticisms by scholars and practitioners alike, Wheare’s notion of federalism still has relevance and enduring elements for Nigeria’s federal system.  I suggest that whether as co-ethnics or co-units, everybody has something to contribute and something to take in a federating nation-state, these may and are often not necessarily tangible and economic. They include non-tangibles such as security, protection and happiness of the federating units. The emphasis of those I call cultural-federalists in Nigeria has been on the centralising nature of the federal structure and the tangible or economic aspect of federalism. These two issues, in my view, make the federalism discourse in Nigeria highly circumscribed, narrow and self-serving. When the cultural-federalists talk about self-determination and resource control, they are blind to the non-tangible aspects of the principle of federalism and they spirit away the give-and-take aspect of federalism.
One way in which the cultural-federalists have addressed the quest of federalism is to clamour for states and local government’s creation. Unfortunately, most of the state and local government creation exercises in Nigeria took place under military rule. The implication is that states were created arbitrarily without respect for the sensitivities of the people, without their input and without recourse to a democratic procedure. Hence, the more states and Local governments are created, the more people agitated for states and local governments. This is because state and local government creation threw up more complex problems or even crisis than they resolved.
The two most profound problems it throws up are the issues of statism and new minorities. The principle of statism is tied to indigeneity. One cannot be a member of a state unless he/she is indigenous to that state; access to state infrastructure is often tied to indigeneity and not citizenship. This means that many people are excluded, in utter disregard to the fact that they are citizens of Nigerian. The other related problem it throws up is that, when new states are created, yesterday’s majority can easily become today’s minorities, and today’s minorities can become tomorrow’s majority. Hence the clamour for states creation is often based on the permutation and calculation by smaller ethnic groups to become dominant ethnic groups in the projected new state being clamoured for or for dominant ethnic group to remain dominant in the old or new state. The clamour for and resistance to state creation is often informed by this logic, and not the often pandered claim of “rapid development” of an area. Today, although the Hausa and Fulani can be said to be demographically in the majority in Northern Nigeria, however, with states creation they are currently in minority in the whole of the North East geographical zone except in Adamawa state where the Fulani constitute the majority. They also constitute minorities in the entire Middle Belt zone.
In the old Kwara state made up of current Kogi and Kwara states, the Yoruba was the majority ethnic group. However, with the creation of Kogi state, the Yoruba became a minority in Kogi state. And the Igala, which used to be a minority in old Kwara state, is now the majority ethnic group in Kogi state. At present, there is hue and cry of ethnic domination of the Igala over the Igbirra, the Yoruba and other ethnic groups in the state. Political power and strategic bureaucratic positions are concentrated in the hands of the Igala. Hence, rather than stem ethnic tension, state creation has intensified political competition along ethnic lines in Kogi state.
CONCEPTUALISING CITIZENSHIP IN africa
Indeed, the citizenship debate has been deeply enriched by the intervention of two African social scientists with keen sense of history. I am referring here to Peter Ekeh, formerly of the University of Ibadan and now of State University of New York (SUNY) and Mahmood Mamdani formerly of Makerere University and now of the University of Columbia, New York. While Ekeh’s work Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, was published in 1975, Mamdani’s Citizens and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Capitalism, made its debut in 1996.
Ekeh’s thematic preoccupation is with the process through which African citizens came about their dual loyalty and allegiance, one to the state and the other to his ethnic or primordial group. The kernel of his argument, is that colonialism bifurcated citizenship in Africa and encouraged a preoccupation with rights  not with civic duties, whereas, in European states, citizenship rights came with civic duties. Thus, in Post–Colonial Africa, so argues Ekeh, there is “the diminution of duties and inflation of rights.” This for him has implication for morality and amorality in both the traditional and primordial spheres and in the public or civic sphere. Richard Joseph in his book titled Democracy and  Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, made a strident attack on Ekeh’s thesis arguing that there is no iron clad dichotomous relationship between the traditional realm and the civil realm, neither is his characterisation of the primordial realm truly so in real life. He further contends that Ekeh’s schema cannot be accepted as scientific benchmark for understanding loyalty and corruption in Nigeria (Joseph, 1991: 1993-4).
In my view, the missing link in the Ekeh-Joseph debate is the conflation of the tradition with the communitarian, and the confusion of culture with economics. And the implication of organised group interest with the role of the individual in a western libertarian political setting. In that regard, the group is overshadowed and subordinated to the will of the individual, often moneybags, elite, or opinion leaders. The flip- side of the argument is the rise of the capitalistic instinct that is fast eroding the communitarian instinct. Hence, while the collective group interest as a basis of  political negotiation is relevant, it is however circumscribed by the dominance of class politics and elite entryism. In this regard, the elite continue to instrumentalise the group or group interest, and moralise corruption in the name of the group who are sentimentally mobilised to blind their eyes to the misdemanour of the son-of-the soil. Taken in this sense, corruption has nothing to do with the divide between the primordial and civic realms but in the perception of the rules of accountability and nature of the prevailing rentier political economy which underlines the principle of primitive capital accumulation in every nascent capitalist economy with an underdeveloped industrial class.
On his part, Mamdani theorises that colonialism created legal dualism in Africa; one civil and the other customary. The settler colonialists were governed by civil law while the ethnic–native was under customary law. The settlers had rights because they were governed under the Western Liberal political system which is rooted to the regime of rights, entitlements and justiciability. The native was under what he calls “decentralized despotism” of the traditional rulers, by which they suffered double oppression as subjects. On a general scale their lives were controlled, along with the traditional ruler, by the colonial authority, and on the local scale, the traditional ruler had absolute control over their lives. They enjoyed privileges and not rights, and privileges could be withdrawn at any time. The settler was a citizen while the native was a subject. Mamdani argued that colonial ideology was based on the principle of racial superiority, and this ideology united all whites, while the ethnic ideology was used to divide the subjects. Hence while race united, ethnicity divided. Hence race empowered the settlers and ethnicity disempowered the natives. The logic of post-colonial citizenship crisis is one of reversal in which yesterday’s native became today’s indigene, and yesterday’s native who was disempowered became empowered. Yesterday’s settler who was the white racist was now replaced with a black settler. And unlike under colonial rule where the settler had power and rights, today’s settler is disempowered and cannot make claims to rights on the basis of national citizenship. This contradictory trend, according to Mamdani, is at the heart of the citizenship and ethnic conflicts in Africa today, and he is correct.
In his intervention on the citizenship debate in Nigeria, Mamdani contends that the history of entitlement has undergone two distinct phases. In the colonial phase “the entitlements were at the expense of the subject races” while in the post-colonial phase there was the successful turning of “indigeneity into the basis of entitlement.” Put differently, “…Africa has succeeded in re-dividing yesterday’s natives into post – colonial settlers and post – colonial natives”.
Indeed, in Mamdani’s examination of the indigene/settler question, he  enunciated a number of principles in understanding identity crisis. Of these principles, three are particularly relevant to the Nigerian situation. The first principle is that the indigene/settler category is interconnected and interloping-as one defines the other. Settlers exist because some people have succeeded in defining themselves as indigenes in order to exclude others, whom they have defined as settlers. Hence indigene/settler relationship is based on the principle of exclusion. Secondly, settlers are not defined merely by immigration. All African groups and peoples, some how, have migrated from one part of the continent to another over an enduring period of time. Consequently, the concept of a settler is a political construction with roots in conquest, state power, coercion and law. Third, the settler can never become a native/indigene since “the basis of differentiation is the denial of civic citizenship through a political imposition of a permanent and exclusionary tribal or religious label.” The net-effect of these principles and characterizations is that they impact negatively on Nigeria’s quest for nationhood.
Ancestral voices, organic citizenship, and ethnicized citizenship
One example from Lagos, which shows the futility of the politics of exclusion to the settler – indigene divide, is the overwhelming evidence of the Nupe factor in Lagos society. The Oshodi Tapa dynasty of Epetedo area of Lagos state is a  good reference here. The ancestor of the dynasty, Oshodi Tapa (Landunji), was Nupe from the Niger area. He was an ex-slave of Oba Esinlokun who later distinguished himself as a valiant warrior and a generalissimo in Oba Kosoko’s various wars. He was the hero of Ogun Olomiro of June 1845 and Ogun Agidingbi, or Ogun Ahoyaya of December 1851 - the “Booming” or “Boiling Battle.” On the military submission of Kosoko’s party to the British Navy, Oshodi Tapa led about 1,500 pro-Kosoko warriors and faithfuls to Epe where they established effective rulership and dominance. The Kosoko’s years in Epe lasted between 1852 and  1862. It is apt to note that all the negotiations for Kosoko’s eventual return to Lagos were handled by Oshodi Tapa. The Lagos area where Kosoko’s followers were settled is now known as Epetedo while an Iga Oshodi has also been instituted. A section of the Oshodi Tapa family is now known as Oshodi – Glover on account of the latter’s association with an ex-colonial chieftain. In Oshodi-Oko, a former farmstead of Oshodi Tapa, an elaborate traditional political structure has also been established.
The integration of Oshodi Tapa, his family and supporters into the Lagos traditional structure is a good example of organic citizenship in Lagos history. If the society of the 19th century could fully assimilate an ex-slave of Nupe ancestry into its mainstream over a period of ten to twenty years as a reward for service and loyalty, what then is the problem with the Nigerian state of the 20th and 21st centuries? Why is the Nigerian state demanding for the absolute militarist loyalty of Nigerians as citizens while at the same time it is fragmenting them along indigene/settler lines? Why is it fixing the tag “son-of-the-soil” on some and at the same time referring to them as “citizens”. This is a contradiction in terms and certainly it is inimical to nation-building efforts. It is also partly the basis of why Nigerians give primary loyalty to their primordial roots and secondary loyalty to the Nigerian state.
The concept of organic citizenship took place in Nigeria prior to colonial conquest; it was accommodative of both settlers and natives and highly integrative. In this way peoples and cultures were absorbed without much hitches. Settlers who controlled  power were often privileged by the colonial masters as the case of Tivland and Zangon Kataf showed.  Yesterday’s natives who were denied rights by the erstwhile colonial masters took over the reins of power as indigenes and denied settlers rights. I will like to caution that it was not in all cases that settlers were denied rights. In certain cases settlers controlled political power and denied indigenes rights. The Sokoto jihad was a settler project which saw the overthrow of the Habe (Hausa) rulers and their replacement with the Fulani who were settlers or strangers. This happened throughout northern Nigeria. This partly explains why the Fulani did not have much sensitivity towards the native question and then the animist and cultural question in their crusade for religious and political revolution throughout northern Nigeria. The consequences of this are still very much with us.
The Yoruba Mfecane of the 19th century also produced crisis of identity for their other Yoruba kiths and kins. For instance, the Ofatedo and Erin-Osun communities of Osun state have their ancestry in Offa and Erin–Ile, now in Kwara State. The Ifon community near Ilobu in the Orolu local government area of Osun State have replicated their ancestry, sequel to a dynastic dispute, at Ifon in Ose local government of Ondo State. These people have not only been balkanized into “new states”, they have been grouped into different local government areas under the 1999 constitution with its attendant federal character principle.
Professor Isola Olomola graphically captures how an Ekiti family of the 19th century is now straddled in three states and three Yoruba sub-groups: the Ekiti, the Ijesa and the Remo. I quote him in extenso:  
An instance, is here cited for illustration: Omole and Aruleola, indigenes of Ado-Ekiti, had three children, namely Ojo, Borida and Anuodo. Two of these, Ojo and Borida were captured during an Ibadan invasion, and finally sold to Osu and Sagamu respectively. Much later, Aruleola knew the whereabouts of her two children but there is no evidence that she actually visited them, but the lone child let behind, Benjamin Anuodo located his brother and sister and established contact. Eventually in about 1947, Mr. Adebola Osiberu was posted to Ado as Health Superintendent and accidentally encountered Anuodo, his uncle. Greater intimacy has since developed.
The Osiberu family played their traditional role as kinsmen at the funeral of Anuodo in Ado in 1972. Mr. Adebola Osiberu behaved as a big brother, in fact, an uncle to  Afolabi Anuodo, Benjamin Anuodo’s eldest son. Afolabi honoured the Osiberu family; Chief Adekunle Osiberu, the Lisa of Makun, Adebola Osiberu and their children, with his presence during the funeral of Borida, his aunt in July, 1983 and led the Anuodo family members of Ado to the funeral of their uncle Ojo who was the Oloriawo of Osu, in September, 1984. Today, Afolabi Anuodo is closely associated  with some of the children and grand children of the Osiberu family of Makun, Sagamu, most of whom he knows by name and, children, grandchildren  and great grandchildren  of Papa Ojo of Osu virtually all of whom he knows by name. Thus three generations or more of Papa Omole’s children, grandchildren and great grandchildren know themselves closely – but the three families belong to three sub-ethnic divisions of the Yoruba, namely Ekiti, Ijesa and Remo.     
Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Sir, it is also instructive to note, that the founding father of the Tinubu dynasty of Kakawa Street, was not a Yoruba man, but rather a Kanuri man named Alfa  Momodu Bugara, otherwise known as Momoh Abubakar  or “Alfa Ibunu.”  Bugara was said to be an outstanding Arabic scholar of Borno extraction whose fame had, in the mid – 19th century, spread beyond Nigeria and as far as Brazil. He was initially in the employment of the acclaimed Madam Efunroye Tinubu as a priest and charm –maker, but the warm and close relationship later blossomed into marriage. The marriage brought honour and prestige to Momodu Bugara as he became the husband and pillar behind Madam Tinubu, a prosperous and wealthy trader, a power-broker, a nationalist, and the power behind Oba Akintoye’s throne. In his own right too,  Momodu Bugara was one of the prominent Muslim leaders of his time as he belonged to the Shakiti  faction of Mosalasi Ehin Ogba,  a bloc within the Lagos Central Mosque. By the standard of the time, he was also a fairly well – to-do man and one of the Muslim elite of the time who was favourably disposed to the nascent Hausa community in Lagos.
Available evidence shows that the union between Madam Tinubu and Momodu Bugara did not produce any child and thus Bugara had to marry other wives. However, the relationship between Madam Tinubu and Alfa Bugara remained very warm, cordial and affectionate. Indeed,  Bugara’s love for Madam Tinubu, a great heroine and political activist,  was so deep and penetrating to the extent that the name “Tinubu” was assumed as the family name. Madam Tinubu’s biographer, Oladipo Yemitan, graphically captures the essence of the name thus:
During this association of Momoh Bukar and Efunroye Tinubu, the latter’s name was so pervasive and all-embracing that all within the household perforce assumed the name “Tinubu.” Included in this household were the children of Momoh Bukar by his other wives and Madame Tinubu’s relatives from Abeokuta who had joined her in Lagos and lived with her. Of course, a number of slaves also assumed the name.
In April 1885, Madam Tinubu was banished from Lagos by Oba Dosunmu due to her militant nationalist activities, but at the instigation of Consul Campbell. She retired to Abeokuta where she later became the Iyalode of Egbaland and where she continued to be politically relevant till her death on December 2, 1887.
Mr. Vice – Chancellor, Sir, today, the current administration of Lagos State is headed by a Tinubu. The Tinubu’s are also generally acknowledged as Lagosians. Another Tinubu headed the Lagos State Civil Service for five years. Others had distinguished themselves in journalism, security and community services, the organized private sector and in other walks of life.
The germane question is thus: Given the existing indigene/settler divide, what should be the attitude of the Tinubus to people of Kanuri stock in Lagos Island or Lagos State?  My position is that any pursuit of politics of exclusion against a Kanuri or Kanuri ethnic group in Lagos State does not resonate with the historical template of the Tinubu ancestry. This is a lesson of history derived from a knowledge and understanding of history. The point is not that all kanuris should come down to Lagos and choke its politics or economy, rather it is that through history we realise that what unites us as Nigerians is far much more than what divides us, and that to promote differences and irreconcilability of our people is a selfish reading or interpretation of our history. Even where our people do not connect culturally they connect religiously or economically and so on. We can build the bridges of unity using the historical cord. This is the thrust of  my thesis.
Furthermore, by the testimony of Alhaji Ismail Babatunde Jose, his great grandfather, Olaosebikan came to Lagos from Ikare, (now in Ondo State) but was subsequently sold into slavery and taken to South America. On emancipation and return to Lagos, he acquired the name of his master, José. Olaosebikan José later married from Arigidi , a suburb of Ikare, a woman named Imoye. She gave birth to Brimoh, Ismail Jose’s grandfather. According to family accounts, Brimoh Jose later married Hajaratu Lafinjuara, daughter of Prince Abidagba, the Crown Prince of Awujale Fidipote of Ijebu – Ode. Brimoh later settled in Calabar where Hamza Jose, the father of Ismail Jose, was born in 1897. Hamza later attended the Hope Waddell Training School, Calabar, but completed his secondary education at King’s College, Lagos, in 1914.
Hamza Jose was blessed with a baby boy named Ismail Babatunde on December 13, 1925 at No 4, Ojubanire Street, Off Agarawu Street, Lagos. By Ismail Jose’s account, his great grandmother, Hawau, was the daughter of Malam Adamu, a “Fulani from Sokoto, who reared cows in the area now known as Cow Lane,  Lagos.” His grandmother,  Ashiatullah was the wife of Abdulsalami Gborigi, son of Muhammadu Gborigi, a Nupe from Bida who lived at No. I, Lewis Street, Lagos. Ismail Jose’s mother, Hajara, was one of the daughters of Salami Gborigi.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, Alhaji Babatunde Jose’s genealogy is connected to Ikare, Arigidi, Ijebu-ode, Sokoto, Bida and he is by residency connected to Lagos and partly to Calabar. The implication of this for ethnic ideologists, is the illogicality and impracticability of ethnic purity. The notion of ethnic purity  is not only a myth but it cannot be sustained in the definition of citizenship or indigeneity. To be sure, Alhaji I.B. Jose’s grandfather, Brimoh Jose, had built a family house at No. 4, Ojubanire’s Lane, Ita Agarawu, before 1925. Also, Olaosebikan José had settled in Calabar, as a trader before 1900 and had built a family house at Garden Street, where Alhaji Jose’s brother, Alabi and Sister, Nimota, were born.
The critical questions which arise here are: is Alhaji Jose, an indigene, a settler of Lagos? Or is he a mere citizen within the context of the Nigerian state as presently constituted? Is it  fair to connect his identity and those of his siblings permanently as “an indigene of Lagos” given the principle of “long stay” and ownership of family property dating to the first decade of the 20th century? What do we consider to be his right or legitimate claim to Owa-Ale chieftaincy in Ikare, if he chooses to exercise such right? Can he use the left finger to point to the royal household of Ijebu-Ode? Can, or should, he be discriminated against by the Nupe or Fulani based on fixed ethnic identity or indigeneity? The  more we probe into this claim the more facile and illogical is our fixations to the indigene/settler divide in the definition of rights and entitlements in Nigeria. While the assertion that “we are all settlers” may sound outlandish if not anachronistic to sustain, the claim of “we are NOT all indigenes” can be considered with more sobriety and reciprocity. This is what makes the claim “we are all citizens”  more defensible and democratically acceptable. Yet the talk of citizenship is overwhelmed, constitutionally, by the rights and entitlements  that accrue to indigenes.
One further example will suffice to illustrate the crisis of indigene/settler. Owu is  an ancient and powerful Yoruba Kingdom. The dynastic founder of Owu kingdom was Anlugbua or Ajibosin whose territory was located around Ikire – Apomu axis of the present Osun State. Through a combination of complex factors which need not detain us here,  Owu kingdom was militarily vanquished and destroyed by Ife, Oyo, Egba and Ijebu forces around 1825. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the exodus of the Owu to more secured places of abode in Yorubaland commenced in earnest.
First, an Owu group settled in the south-western part of Abeokuta in 1834. At Abeokuta, this group represented the fourth wav of settlers after Ake, Agura and Oke – Ona. At Abeokuta, the Owu established only three ruling families: Otilela, Ayoloye and Amororo. Owu in Abeokuta is now an Egba Community and has three local governments: Abeokuta North, Ewekoro and Ifo. The second wave of Owu migrants also established another settlement in 1854 at Owu – Ikija, a territory which hitherto belonged to Olisa of Ikija. This settlement is currently referred to as Owu–Ikija. Thirdly, another segment of Owu refugees also settled in an area now known as Owu–Ijebu with only two recognisable ruling houses Ibese and Ebadela. The refugees had, in fact, established different quarters at Omu, Gbawojo, Ido-Owu in Okun-Owa, Oke-Agbo and Oke-Sapon in Ijebu–Igbo. In the course of the 19th century, some Owu refugees settled around Ibadan axis.
The implication of these diasporic Owus on indigene/settler question is that the Owu Yoruba have multiple indigeneship and citizenship claims across the south-western states. The Owu person is an indigene as well as a settler within various states in south west Nigeria. For instance, the Owu person in Abeokuta is a settler in Osun and Oyo states and also in the Ijebu local government area of Ogun State. Indeed, what is the claim of “indigeneity” of the Owu to these respective territories? The reality is that the Owu are “settlers” but they would not want to be addressed as such.
Perhaps, we may pose a riddle about the status of President Obasanjo in Owu. He is not just the Balogun of Owu but he has also acquired the title, the Anlugbua of Owu, the founding ancestor of the Owu Kingdom. Thus, Obasanjo is making a claim of autochthony. This point is important given the aboriginal status of Owu in the context of Yoruba-speaking peoples. The popular saying is “Owu l’a koko da, Bi e d’ Owu e bere wo” (Owu was the primary state to be established, this is a fact that can be confirmed in Owu).  Indeed, at the recent celebration of the 30th Anniversary of Ogun State, President Obasanjo not only  proclaimed his Egba indigeneship, he also harped on the autochthony of Owu, his ancestral roots. President Obasanjo’s indigeneity of Owu and Egba, his citizenship of Nigeria and his status as No. 1 citizen of Nigeria and the upholder of the 1999 constitution are quite worrisome and problematic. What was the objective? And what does it portend for ethnic purists who do not believe in the Nigerian project? A situation where the professed promoter of national unity was projecting his primordial identity above that of  the nation is certainly not a positive signal to a nation in identity crisis.     
Who Owns the Land?
The question of autochthony of any ethnic group, nationality or race is an essentially contested and controversial one.  In the beginning, so the Biblical account of creation tells us, “the earth was without form and void and the spirit of God was moving on the surface of the waters”. By striking coincidence, studies on the environment of the early earth “have led scientists to visualise a time early in earth when the surface was covered with oceans or lakes that were rich in molecules fundamental to life”! For us as historian, this postulation remains an unsatisfactory answer since it is not the product of any verifiable scientific thesis or hypothesis. However, what is evidently apparent from the Biblical and Quranic accounts of creation is that, “in the beginning”, the earth existed before humanity. It is thus valid to argue that all human beings are settlers, across national boundaries and continents. But we must not make this claim in any misguided sense. Otherwise, non-Nigerians may even come to Nigeria and proclaim that “we are all settlers”!
Around present day Kenya and Ethiopia, about 150,000 years ago, it is suggested that all mankind lived and had their common ancestors of the pre-historic age. On the authority of Dr. and Mrs. Leakey, we know that the “Garden of Eden”, “the Cradle of Human Civilization”, where humanity evolved from the primates to the Homo-Sapiens (the knowledgeable man), existed at Njoroge Valley, Olduvai George, Kenya. Through research, we can assert with some scientific confidence that it was from Kenya or East African region that human beings began the process of migration to other parts of the world. Thus, we are all products of what Leakey calls the same “genetic heritage”. Indeed, geneticists have submitted that, given the established studies on DNA, the present generation of humans is about 7,500 generations away from the Homo-Sapiens.
The critical issue germane to this lecture, however, is how to determine the “autochthonous” or “indigenous” people or groups in Nigeria, given the entrenched positions on indigene/ settler question in existing political discourse especially its debilitating impact on the citizenship question..
The Authentic Indigenes and Autochthones           
In the world and Africa, existing-studies by Archaeologists have provided evidence from antiquity of human habitation. In the Nigerian geographical region, one of such areas, Nok (Plateau State) has radio-carbon dated to C. 39,000 B.C. Other notable areas of early human existence include Mejiro Cave (Oyo State), Rop (Plateau), Diama (Borno), Ile-Ife (Osun State), Benin (Edo State), Igbo-Ukwu (Anambra State) and Iwo Eleru (Ondo State). Of particular   significance in the context of Yoruba history is Ile–Ife which is ascribed primacy. In Yoruba oral literature, Ife is “Ile-Ife, Ile Owuro, Ile – Ife Odaiye, Nibiti Ojumo ti no wa, Ile–Ife ori aiye  gbogbo” (Ile – Ife, the Land of  the most ancient days – the dawn. Ile–Ife, where the work of creation took place, where the dawn of the day was first experienced, Ile–Ife, the head or nucleus of the whole universe). Despite the much acclaimed status of Ile–Ife, early evidence of earliest human hominids was not found but at Iwo–Eleru near Oba–Ile, Akure, which according to Frank Willet, remains “the earliest Homo Sapiens yet excavated in West Africa”.
In determining the antiquity of Nigerian cultures and civilizations, linguists have also deployed their scientific tools to this end. And by the authorities  of such experts  as Greenberg, Armstrong  and Kay Williamson, all the 397 languages of Nigeria indexed in 1976, belong to three families of languages, namely: Niger – Congo, Chadic and Nilo-Saharan. One striking feature about the origin of these languages is that they are all located outside the Nigerian area. The implication of this is that early speakers of these languages moved as settlers to the Nigerian region from else where. Properly put, all Nigerian ethnic groups, at some point, were all “settlers” before they started defining and identifying themselves as “indigenes”. To be sure, the notion of indigene existed because there is a notion of settler.
What historical evidence do we have then to substantiate the claim that some ethnic nationalities/groups in Nigeria are “indigenous”, while others are “settlers”? Can there be a situation where some communities in Nigeria can lay historical, geographical or legal claim to “indigeneity” of a particular geographical land mass on a ‘permanent, fixed and immutable basis”? Put differently, the question remains as posed by that leading scholar, Mamdani, “When does a settler become a native”?  From the point of view of the native, the settler can never become a native!
the Federal character policy and the indigeneship question
The indigeneship / settler question discussed here in historical context can be related to contemporary Nigeria. Under the present circumstances, the one seminal document designed to address the problem remains the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In its essentials, the federal constitutions since independence have made provisions aimed at guaranteeing both individual and common citizenship rights to all Nigerians.
However, at the political and public policy level, there is another subset of what is called indigeneship rights which are  ethnic or sub-ethnic group rights. Herein lies the problem of the Nigerian constitutional arrangements. This is to the effect that it provides or rather exposes the federal system, currently in operation, to a certain level of divided or dual citizenship-between group rights and individual rights and it privileges group rights over individual rights and hence the rights of ethnic groups, particularly of indigenes over citizens. The Nigerian citizen who is a non-indigene is constantly faced with the challenge of residency qualifications which is attributed to the duration of residency within a given state. This requirement is analogous to the acquisition of national citizenship by nationalization. The other criterion for citizenship acquisition within a state is tied to consanguinity, patriarchy or primordial values, which cannot be acquired by residency.
This duality of the criteria of citizenship within the Nigerian Federation is linked to what Professor Adele Jinadu qualifies as the problem of “fractured citizenship”. It makes it extremely difficult for some category of Nigerians to enjoy full citizenship rights in those states to which they have migrated. In short, a precarious dichotomy has developed between Nigerian citizenship and indigeneity in states especially for Nigerians living outside their states of origin and who are accordingly regarded as “native foreigners”.
Moreover, the entrenchment of the Federal Character principle is at the centre of the differentiation of Nigerian citizens rather than their integration and accommodation. Hence, in an attempt to solve the problems of federalism arising from uneven development and exclusion, the federal character principle has produced new sets of problems. Put differently, the federal character principle, as a solution, has become problematic. The challenge before scholars is to examine the problems with the solution of the federal character principle. Yet the principle is at the heart of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Nigerian Constitutions. It was in an attempt to address the fallout of this, that the Political Bureau set up in 1987 recommended that laws should be promulgated to tie citizenship rights to either place of birth or residence such that any Nigerian who has lived in any part of the country for ten years can enjoy full residency rights, which must include all rights normally available to the traditional indigenes of the states.
The example of Group Captain Dan Suleiman is worth mentioning at this juncture. Then Governor of Plateau State, Dan Suleiman had in 1976 proposed for Plateau state that any Nigerian born in Plateau State or any Nigerian from any other state who has lived in Plateau state for twenty years should enjoy all the rights and privileges of a native of Plateau State. However, the “Suleiman principle” as progressive as it was, did not enjoy instant national acceptability and accordingly was not adopted as a national policy.
Judged from a historical standpoint, the Federal character may have provided access to power, wealth and influence among a privileged few, but when examined against the background of the citizenship – indigeneship question - it is by and large a product of contradiction. This contradiction is reflected in the imprecise way it is defined  by its proponents. It is vague and therefore of limited scientific value. It is both vague and cosmetic especially in terms of its contribution to the ethno-moral debate on the one hand and the politico-moral balance on the other.
Although, the federal character is usually hailed as  promoting national unity, its fundamental objective remains imprecise. Even the aspiration that federal character will nourish and harness the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion for the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has not always produced the desired outcome. The contrary has rather been the case. This is why Professor Adele Jinadu aptly refers to this principle as promoting ethno-federalism.
The contradictions are observable in two major ways – freedom of movement and freedom of discrimination. Free movement is here referred to not only in spatial / horizontal manner but also includes career choice and upward social mobility. However, for some groups, the federal character encourages social mobility while for others it tends to stunt self-realization in a discriminatory manner. For example, subjecting appointments and/or promotions to federal character consideration discriminates against merit and could therefore be unfair to certain groups. Such a tendency no doubt undermines national unity. To be sure, I am not stating that the merit principle be applied all through, even in advanced democracies such as the United States of America, quota is used in relation to minorities and disadvantaged peoples and groups, but not at the expense of merit. In Nigeria, the federal character principle has compromised merit and totally made it irrelevant.
Ethno-federalism has been a major philosophical inspiration for the indigeneity ideologues. But the damage it has done is such that indigeneity now speaks in the language of exclusion; and the principle of exclusion is rested on the pillar of denial. But once a set of citizens are denied certain entitlements, then their rights have been violated and if rights cannot be guaranteed to all on a common template then there is not justice. But a clear picture of the indigene/settler divide is that one speaks the language of rights and the other speaks the language of privileges; one speaks the language of inclusion and the other speaks the language of exclusion; one speaks the language of justice and the other speaks the language of revenge. The danger of having two sets of citizens speaking from separate tables is more complex than making allusion to politicization of ethnicity, religion and so on. Matters are not helped by various Nigerian constitutions, which, since 1979 recognised and upheld this form of social and political relations as the basis of promoting unity in diversity! We all can see that such a claim is contradictory and false.
Conclusion
Mr. Vice – Chancellor, Sir, one obvious conclusion from the analyses of this lecture is the compelling necessity to recognize the interface of history and national integration to promote inter-communal tolerance, pan–Nigerian consciousness and strengthen democratic governance. For national integration to be an achievable goal, pan –Nigerian consciousness has to be deliberately nurtured and developed to dwarf other forms of consciousness.     
In the context of this Lecture, the undertakers are those who want to compel us to suffer historical amnesia, i.e. those who want to bury our past. The undertakers are those who burn or destroy government records and property with intent to denying us access to what happened before and during their tenures; and they are also those who smuggle illicit clauses into our constitutions. Included in this group of undertakers are the ethnic entrepreneurs and jingoists; those who often politicise and instrumentalise ethnicity so that they can have access to power and scarce resources; those who want to keep Nigerians permanently divided on “indigene/settler” divide; those who want to roll back history as though nothing has happened to us since 1914. The undertakers must, however, learn from history.
History has an enduring role to play in our lives. Among the Khama of Rivers State of Nigeria, a person who demonstrates ignorance of the culture and traditions of the people is “described as a son who did not get to know his father.” Indeed, among the Khama, history empowers the individual with “the vision of the python” and “with ears keen enough to hear even the soft footstep of the ant.” 
Mr. Vice – Chancellor, Sir, the way of life of the Ant is so germane to the thesis  of my lecture. Permit me to quote, in extenso, the following passage on that wise insect:
Ants have more of their own kind in this world than most other living creatures. For every 700 million ants that come into this world, there are only 40 new – born human beings. In other words, the number of  ants in the world is  way above the number of human beings.
Ant families are also very big. For instance, you probably have a family of 4 – 5 people. In an ant family, however, there are sometimes millions of ants. Now  think for a minute; if you had millions of brothers  and sisters, would you be able to live in a single house? Surely not!
The astonishing features of ants do not end here. Despite the fact that millions of them live together, they have no problems with each other, no mix – ups and no disorder. They live an extremely well planned life with everyone obeying the rules. Some ant families do tailoring, others grow their own food like farmers, and yet others run small farms where they raise some smaller animals. In the same way as human beings breed cows and use their milk, ants breed small plant lice (aphids) and use their milk.
To sum up, I state as follows: there is an attempt to reject post-colonial history of Nigeria by ethno-nationalists, cultural-federalists and ethno-federalists, all in the name of self-determination and resource control. In so doing they point to the mistake of amalgamation and colonialism. Hence they reject colonialism as being the basis of Nigeria’s citizenship crisis. This rejectionist tendency does not seem to take into account the basis of anti-colonial nationalism which is not merely a rejection of colonialism but also an attempt to negate it. Post-colonial rule is a political attempt to negate the legacies of colonialism. The attempt to insist that pre-colonial relations of nations and culture should be grafted on post-colonial Nigeria has not addressed the challenge posed by organic citizenship of that era. How can we reconstruct citizenship in Nigeria in order to make it organic? I believe that the citizenship question has been so politicised to make a mere constitutional solution useful or meaningful; we need a political solution as well. This political solution should be anchored on massive social reorientation and mobilization around a national project; it should be people-driven and people-focused.
Tension still exists between two legacies - the legacy of pre-colonial rule where the ethno-nationalists feel that true citizenship can be achieved and the legacy of post-colonial citizenship which is rejected as a continuation of colonial legacy by the ethno-nationalists. The recognition of colonialism as responsible for the citizenship crisis and the rejectionist approach to the colonial legacy does not solve the problem. Rather than seek to reject the colonial legacy we should seek to negate it. Negating the colonial legacy means transcending it not through a relapse to the pre-colonial nation, but in a transition into a future defined by nation-state relations. The construction of nation-state rather than the nation is the greatest challenge that we are faced with today. The tension arising from the two legacies is rooted to the fact that the traditional organic citizenship was embedded in a communitarian spirit, while the colonial liberal citizenship was embedded in the market logic. The tension generated between the communitarian culture and the spirit of the market in post-colonial Nigeria is a riddle that has exacerbated the crisis of citizenship. Initially, when the state responded to the challenge through mixed economy, state capitalism or the policy of developmentalism, it was applauded. But the rolling back of the state and the complete transition to the market has led to a new spate of liberal individualism which has exposed the citizen and made recourse to the ethnic group a constant touchstone in order to explain away the respect or denial of rights.
Finally, the citizenship crisis is at the heart of the identity crisis in Nigeria, and identity crisis is a product of the unresolved issues and questions of history. History fosters a better understanding of a people. Our past remains a myth to us, so long as we failed to study, discover and make it serve our current quest for nationhood. There is no law of history that states that unless people are culturally and ancestrally homogenous they cannot live in peace and harmony or make common claims to rights and entitlements. When colonial anthropologists described Africans as a “historyless” people, we all accused them of racism and responded through defensive historiography ably pioneered by the Ibadan School of History. That School of History was later challenged by the Dar-es-Salaam School of History and the Zaria School of History. There is a lot about our history that is yet to be known and discovered. Those who politicise the citizenship question need to revert to that history, study and discover it. They will then realise that just as Cheikh Anta Diop postulated a long time ago, as Africans, we are culturally united because we are one people. The cultural oneness of our people negates any attempt to divide us along sub-ethnic, sub-linguistic and sub-national lines. My conclusion is that the ignorance of African history is at the heart of the crisis of citizenship, and this ignorance is worse than being described as a historyless people. We have a rich history which our elite have failed to study, and as a result of that failure they have plunged our citizens into a crisis of nationhood, through malgovernance, unstatemanly statecraft and the politicisation of differences.
We must all learn history as pupils, students, statesmen and citizens. What kind of history should we learn? We should learn history that can empower us as Africans and that will emancipate our people. What is Nigeria’s policy on history as a subject, history as a curriculum and history as a pedagogy? It is a pathetic story of neglect and lack of interest. We must go back to the drawing board and rethink how to teach our history. We must take advantage of the new Information Technology; improved techniques on radio-carbon dating; we must adopt a multimedia and visual approach to simplify our history and keep it alive in public consciousness. Soft wares and online versions of past works of great writers such as Samuel Johnson, Ajisafe, J. B. Losi, Apollo Kagwa, Akiga Sai, Carl Christian Reindorf, Abu Ikokoro, Jacob Egharevba, N.A. Fadipe, Abubakar Imam, T. Ola Avoseh, and so on must be brought alive, simplified and popular versions should be published and made affordable and accessible to Nigerians and all those interested in our history. It is in this respect that I urge the Federal government to resuscitate the (now) moribund “Panel on Nigeria Since Independence History Project” which was then headed by Professor Tekena Tamuno. Its mandate should be broadened beyond 1960 to cover the pre-colonial era. It should also take interest in oral history and culture of Nigeria. 

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